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	<title>Michael Gracie &#187; adjustable rate mortgages</title>
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	<link>http://michaelgracie.com</link>
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	<pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2008 16:21:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Alan Greenspan on risk</title>
		<link>http://michaelgracie.com/2008/03/17/alan-greenspan-on-risk/</link>
		<comments>http://michaelgracie.com/2008/03/17/alan-greenspan-on-risk/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 2008 14:29:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Michael Gracie</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Notes]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[adjustable rate mortgages]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Alan Greenspan]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[housing debacle]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://michaelgracie.com/2008/03/17/alan-greenspan-on-risk/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Denial and insanity are next door neighbors
Via FT:
We will never be able to anticipate all discontinuities in financial markets. Discontinuities are, of necessity, a surprise. Anticipated events are arbitraged away. But if, as I strongly suspect, periods of euphoria are very difficult to suppress as they build, they will not collapse until the speculative fever [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<!-- sphereit start --><p><em>Denial and insanity are next door neighbors</em></p>
<p>Via <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/edbdbcf6-f360-11dc-b6bc-0000779fd2ac.html">FT</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>We will never be able to anticipate all discontinuities in financial markets. Discontinuities are, of necessity, a surprise. Anticipated events are arbitraged away. But if, as I strongly suspect, periods of euphoria are very difficult to suppress as they build, they will not collapse until the speculative fever breaks on its own.</p></blockquote>
<p>Mr. Greenspan left out a very important point&#8230;the one about him touting the merits of adjustable-rate mortgages at the peak of the &#8220;euphoria.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>The Roots of the Mortgage Crisis (just got burned early)</title>
		<link>http://michaelgracie.com/2007/12/12/the-roots-of-the-mortgage-crisis-just-got-burned-early/</link>
		<comments>http://michaelgracie.com/2007/12/12/the-roots-of-the-mortgage-crisis-just-got-burned-early/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2007 22:05:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Michael Gracie</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Office]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[adjustable rate mortgages]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Alan Greenspan]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://michaelgracie.com/2007/12/12/the-roots-of-the-mortgage-crisis-just-got-burned-early/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Just because you stop throwing fuel on a fire doesn&#8217;t mean the flames are going to immediately burn out.
While Alan Greenspan speaks:
I do not doubt that a low U.S. federal-funds rate in response to the dot-com crash, and especially the 1% rate set in mid-2003 to counter potential deflation, lowered interest rates on adjustable-rate mortgages [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<!-- sphereit start --><p><em>Just because you stop throwing fuel on a fire doesn&#8217;t mean the flames are going to immediately burn out.</em></p>
<p>While <a href="http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010981">Alan Greenspan speaks</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>I do not doubt that a low U.S. federal-funds rate in response to the dot-com crash, and especially the 1% rate set in mid-2003 to counter potential deflation, lowered interest rates on adjustable-rate mortgages and may have contributed to the rise in U.S. home prices. In my judgment, however, the impact on demand for homes financed with ARMs was not major.</p>
<p>Demand in those days was driven by the expectation of rising prices&#8211;the dynamic that fuels most asset-price bubbles. If low adjustable-rate financing had not been available, most of the demand would have been financed with fixed rate, long-term mortgages. In fact, home prices continued to rise for two years subsequent to the peak of ARM originations</p></blockquote>
<p>&#8230;everyone should keep in mind that Chairman Greenspan was publicly extolling the virtue of using adjustable rate mortgages even as things started looking awry.</p>
<p>UPDATE: Paul Kedrosky meets <a href="http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2007/12/12/greenspan_not_m.html">Mr. NotMe</a>.  Don&#8217;t worry, it was &#8220;not major.&#8221;</p>
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