All Posts Tagged Bailout

When Should the Fed Crash the Party?

May 13th, 2008

Peter Bernstein pits Mellon against Keynes (and Greenspan and Bernanke against the tide).  The tome is shutting off the open bar to prevent the hangover.

(h/t to The Big Picture)

Editor’s Note:

Bernstein is author of two books I’ve read, The Power of Gold: The History of an Obsession and Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk. They are both quite worthy, and both certainly relevant to our “inflation ex-inflation” (quote pilfered from Barry Ritholtz) times. However, I found The Power of Gold more enlightening than the latter - Bernstein waxes poetic on the history of the metal, and concludes its worth is only in the eyes of the beholder. Against the Gods, on the other hand, won’t hit you like a Louisville Slugger unless you have some minimal exposure to elementary statistics. I’ve long since passed “Gold” on to a commodities trading friend, but Against the Gods still sits on the shelf. And if someone can develop a salient, but not necessarily completely risk-averse, argument as to why the Fed (and Congress, and the Treasury, and the rest of the Administration) should play hands off here, invariably allowing the meek to inherit (or at least take full economic advantage of) the scraps, I’ll send them my un-abused copy of Against the Gods for their reading pleasure.

Post your thesis in the comments, or put it on your blog and post a link down yonder. In addition, rationale to the contrary (why governmental bodies should step in and start paying your neighbor’s mortgage) will also be accepted, although taking that path may be fraught with risk ;-) .

Could the US deflate its way out of a financial crises?

May 7th, 2008

In theory, what if…

You let those who are about to be foreclosed on be foreclosed on. Bank inventories would rise, and house prices would fall. This is called correction, and in many circles it is considered healthy. Rather than pour capital into the inevitably failing cause of bailouts, relax restrictions on the purchase of foreclosure properties. Lenders provide capital to those that qualify, instead of requiring investors to show up with a check for the full purchase price. Potential buyers sitting on the sidelines (with healthy credit ratings and plenty of savings) move in because there is now the visible possibility of a return on equity. Prices stabilize.

Meanwhile, people that probably shouldn’t have been owners in the first place - they didn’t have a down payment and/or had to fudge their income - go back to renting. Rents rise with demand, and price/rent ratios move towards historical equilibrium. Those highly credit-worthy borrowers with an understanding of the basic concept of return on capital and positive cash flow (please move over, Carlton Sheets crowd), move in further. This time they are buying to maintain, rent out, and garner a long term return on their investment - not flip to the next joker two days after they close.

Lenders are already putting the kibosh on home equity lines, so there is no need to argue this will bring the consumer-led economy to a screeching halt. Prices of everyday goods are taking care of that, and much of the non-core inflation is a direct result of interest rates and the falling dollar. Yes, demand will fall, but a significant amount that demand is consumers’ insatiable appetite for foreign goods. If the influx of good manufactured outside the US slows, you trip a decline in commodities prices - foreign demand in foreign currencies slows as a result of shrinking sales to the US, exacerbated by a stronger dollar on the back of dwindling supplies of it.

While markets aren’t keen to consider the effects of negative growth with a smile, maybe they should consider the effect of rising margins too. Falling prices means decreasing cost of goods too. Meanwhile, price conscious consumers see bargains everywhere, which negates some of the revenue declines and the unemployment associated with it.

Heck, we’re a services economy anyway, and it’s going to take plenty of accountants and attorneys and bankers to get those foreclosed homes into the right hands. And plenty of plumbers and electricians and interior designers to fix them up. Retirees make crap a few bricks while watching the Dow correct itself, but if you have 2/3rds of the savings you had before while a gallon of gas costs 1/3rd what it did while you were socking away, why would that matter? We might also see rising interest rates under this scenario, which means fixed income portfolio losses (on paper) but plenty of extra cash flow to support daily needs.

Yes, it all means some pain, especially for trading partners. I suspect the far east economies wouldn’t be particularly pleased at the thought of forced moderation to their now improving lifestyles. And first you have to buy into the idea we do truly live in a global economy - and that decoupling doesn’t exist.

Could it work?

UPDATE: Some of this might happen whether we like it or not - the Fed is finally already warning on inflation.

UPDATE 2: More on housing price/rent ratios. Note that the forecast doesn’t reflect rising rents - the spike is caused by projected housing price adjustment.

Bernanke reiterates that everyone should screw and be screwed

May 6th, 2008

The Fed Chairman is “reiterating” ad nauseum. Screwing follows.

I reiterate we need to forgive people for their misinterpretation of basic economic fundamentals

Bernanke, in a speech in New York today, reiterated his call for lenders to forgive portions of mortgages for some struggling homeowners. He said proposals should be “tightly targeted” at borrowers at greatest risk of losing their properties, and avoid providing an incentive for defaults.

The map is not pretty (scroll to the bottom) - states that are vital to the condition of the overall economy are showing heavy leverage, heavy delinquencies, as well as heavy “non-owner” occupation. Price drops are now being singled out as THE reason people are getting pummeled, and the Fed is urging banks to unilaterally revise mortgage terms to put mortgagees on an even keel. Screw market economics.

The people most at risk of default are: 1) those who have the least “skin in the game” (i.e. those who put the least amount of money down under the assumption that home prices would rise forever); and 2) those that as a result of delusional assumptions thought becoming a real estate investor was a guaranteed lottery win. As generous as banks are historically known to be, they aren’t going to reduce mortgage principal to a point where borrowers are sitting pretty - no, they are going to revalue homes and adjust loans down to just that new level. Mortgagees will still be without their imaginary wealth, and they’ll still be on the hook for the original principal amount should the house sell down the road. In other words, they are still screwed, and I suspect there will be few takers either.

The potential ill side effect of this?

During summer past, everyone thought that the mortgage problem was contained to the sub-prime sector. It was portrayed across the media spectrum as a low-income borrower, low-end housing problem. “Sub-prime, sub-prime, sub-prime” was drilled into the citizen vocabulary. However, it is becoming more apparent to more people that containment wasn’t the case, and now that the problem is being recast as a nationwide, multi-tiered issue of pricing. The predicted result - accelerating defaults. Anyone with the means to continue paying their mortgage, and who has now bought into the idea that their home really is worth less than their mortgage, is going to bring their stated income down to size and either beg the bank for a favor or downright threaten their lender with walking unless they do. The latter becomes an even more substantive ploy if the borrower is aware of the court backlog in foreclosure proceedings, the growing inventory of bank-owned properties, and/or the fact that the court system isn’t buying shoddy mortgage record keeping.

I reiterate that government subsidization is the answer, no matter what the long term cost may be

Bernanke also reiterated his call for a stronger role for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-chartered companies that are the biggest sources of money for U.S. mortgages, to ease the crisis.

This, in spite of the fact that Fannie Mae lost 2.2 billion in the latest quarter and is now planning to raise billions in additional capital to stay afloat. As THE primary funder of mortgages, Fannie Mae (and Freddie Mac) are getting screwed - they will wind up taking a hit for the principal reductions on in-house paper. But with the Fed behind them, they can probably screw investors down line - the ones who invested in their bonds for their secure, income-generating potential. The ones that aren’t invited to the negotiating table. And of course they get to screw the last money in - $6 billion is likely the minimum necessary to keep the GSAs’ regulatory formulas in line, but unless they magically begin turning a profit they’ll be back at the trough in no time.

In the midst of conjuring this post, the market was not reacting as such. While Fannie Mae bleeds from all orifices, the market was taking light of the fact that Fannie said their loan quality was going to go up, and the stock was following the same path. It may take a few days or weeks to sink in, but dilution and/or unservice-able debt are rarely good ingredients for a stock’s price. Furthermore, the magic awaits - how is Fannie going to increase their purchases of “at-the-money” loans to desperate borrowers while portraying it as a higher quality portfolio? They can’t…someone’s going to get screwed.

Cringing at the thought of more screwing, and looking forward to continued reiteration.

UPDATE: Dan Mudd, CEO of Fannie Mae, says

“We’ve got to get across a bridge where we don’t miss the opportunities we have…we will feast off this book of business we are putting on.”

Easy to say when the alternative is feasting on taxpayer dollars if you don’t get across the bridge, thereby missing all those wonderful opportunities.

UPDATE 2: More Fannie Mae facts.

Bear Stearns no longer

March 16th, 2008

The Wall Street Journal calls it a rescue, but at roughly $2 per share I doubt anyone but the remaining prime brokerage clients and derivative counterparties are looking at it that way.

Monday the company was trading at $70 per share, which sounds more like a bloodbath.

In a short conversation this evening with a friend from the Street, he noted that this was downright ominous. 97% of the market value of the fifth (?) largest investment bank in the world disappeared into thin air in 144 hours. Who else is out there with such destructive off-balance sheet liabilities of a similar magnitude? And who is really left to “rescue” them?

…with the exception of the Fed (and maybe some tech companies that have zero debt and tens of billions of cash on hand)…?

Bailing out your neighbor

December 17th, 2007

Alan Greenspan is now promoting a direct taxpayer-funded bailout of homeowners. Mr. Greenspan has been trying very hard to shift blame for the mortgage crisis, but this statement takes the cake. Begging for increased Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA limits serves much the same purpose. It’s socializing losses.

Be forewarned - a direction is being drawn. A 600 FICO score and a pile of credit card debt is no problem - you are hereby authorized to sign any borrowing agreement you can get your hands on. You won’t need to return that widescreen TV that’s now a part of your HELOC. That leased car you’ve already missed two payments on? It’s yours - just keep it.

It’s not a liquidity issue, or one of solvency. It’s a government problem.

A solution for your debt overindulgence is close at hand - you’re neighbor will soon be bailing you out.

UPDATE: More support for subsidies, at the high end of the market. The high end hasn’t started getting whacked, yet.

UPDATE 2: Yet more on neighbors, including how some are being hurt by the questionable decisions of others.

UPDATE 3: And back to blaming the Fed.

White House pledges help for subprime mortgage borrowers (for brownie points)

September 1st, 2007

Sad, but true.

This is a politically expeditious course of action - portray the image of coming to the rescue even if the markets know it’s somewhat futile to interfere

I think of the underlying game as “seek the sucker”: sucker number one is persuaded to borrow too much; sucker number two is sold the debt created by lending to sucker number one; sucker number three is the taxpayer [that's you!] who rescues the players who became rich from lending to sucker number one and selling to sucker number two.

It’s more like four or five suckers, each paying a premium to the previous for the privilege of holding an asset for a split second. And it’s profitable to do so, until the change in the market value of the collateral turns negative. Then you start playing accounting games.

The plethora of intermediaries has dispersed, so it’s easy to place the blame on them. Hold yourself out as the white knight, and score a few brownie points in the process. Unfortunately, baked goods aren’t good collateral for securitized loans.

UPDATE: Meanwhile, this isn’t going to help matters, but I’m sure the resulting spin will be fun hearing. At least government workers won’t take pay cuts (even if everyone else does).

Let the markets prevail in the subprime mortgage “debacle”

June 5th, 2007

I was hard pressed to call it a debacle, but I couldn’t think of a better word. Still, when I think about it I keep hearing Resolution Trust Corporation bells in my ears. Steve Berger says:

Let contractual arrangements remain in force, let good lenders prosper and bad ones suffer (similarly with borrowers) and let the taxpayers’ pockets go unpicked. Legislative interference with market processes is likely only to prolong and deepen the downturn.

I concur, but legislators only know how to legislate. Look at the bright side…if government steps in, institutions will have less need to raise rates.